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1 Introduction 
This study belongs to a series of investigations on emergency response experience 
in the EEC countries with the aim of gaining valuable knowledge on emergency 
management and supplying information to the Community Documentation Centre 
on Industrial Risks. Similar studies have been performed in the United Kingdom, 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany and are currently being completed in 
all other EEC countries. 
The Danish study on emergencies after accidents involving dangerous sub-
stances has been conducted by the Risk Analysis Group, Ris~ National Labora-
tory. Work on this contract was done by Lene Smith-Hansen, Dan S.Nielsen and 
Carsten D.Gr~nberg (project manager). The work was supervised by Kurt E.Peter-
sen. 
To support the work with information on emergency organizations and establish-
ing contacts to personnel involved in the actual cases a contact group was set up: 
• Erling Vangsted, National Agency of Environmental Protection. 
• Hans Hagen, Danish Working Environment Service. 
• Jan Petersen, Emergency Management Agency. 
• J~rgen Jacobsen, Emergency Management Agency. 
• Kent Bergstr~m. Commissioner of Police. 
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2 Scope 
Ris(ij has detailed the scope as follows: 
• Accident period: 1980-1992. 
• Place of accident: land, sea, air. 
• Consequence type: specific harm or threat to humans or the environment. 
• Activity or process (accident domain): production, industry, storage, trans-
port. 
• Accident type: no a priori limitation. 
• Criteria for selection of cases: 
• One or more dangerous chemical substances should play a significant 
role for accident course or consequences, no matter if it was present at 
the time of the accident, if it was produced during the accident course, 
or was introduced during mitigation. 
• Cases with only minor effects from the dangerous substances may be 
studied, if there is a prospect of significant emergency experience, 
which could be important under different circumstances. 
• Besides reporting the lessons learnt, the study will report briefly on the status 
and principal changes under way in Danish emergency organizations, which 
may be significant with respect to chemical emergencies. 
The second criterion for case selection was added, because Danish industry and 
Danish transport activities would hardly be able to contribute significant accidents 
to the European picture, and thus we could miss opportunities to highlight the 
qualities of the Danish emergency organizations. 
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3 Selection of accidents 
The Danish authorities are reporting greater accidents with dangerous substances 
to the Major Accident Reporting System at Ispra, and the study group therefore 
first looked into eight Danish MARS cases acquired from the contact group. After 
reviewing the MARS material and relevant periodicals from the period 1980-
1992, the following cases were chosen for closer studies: 
• Dansk Sojakagefabrik, explosion, 1980. 
• Mustard gas bombs in fishing trawl, Baltic Sea, 1984. 
• Nordisk Alkali Biokemi, decomposition of pesticide, 1985. 
• Valdemar Larsen metal working, release of chlorine, 1985. 
• Matas warehouse fire, Aarhus, 1988. 
• Maribo seeds company, fire involving toxic substances and dust, 1989. 
• Nrestved railway accident, release of acrylonitrile, 1992. 
None of these cases caused fatalities. 
Three of the selected cases are included in the MARS database, i.e. Dansk 
Sojakagefabrik, Valdemar Larsen metal working and Maribo seeds company. The 
accident at Dansk Sojakagefabrik has been studied previously (Rasmussen et a1, 
1987). The remaining five MARS cases were left out of this study, because the 
related emergency experience was judged less significant. 
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4 Data collection form 
Below follows a general data collection form to be used for description of the 
selected accidents. The data collection form has been constructed using the same 
main entries as in the MARS database. However, since the purpose of the present 
study is to evaluate the emergency response after chemical accidents the import-
ance of the accident causes is reduced. 
Furthermore, the content of the FIRE database has also been used as inspiration. 
This database has been constructed as part of the CEC STEP project "Combustion 
of Chemical Substances and the Impact on the Environment of the Fire Products" 
(Contract no. STEP CT91-0109), (Koivisto & Nielsen, 1993). Finally, the data 
collection forms shown in the similar British, German, Greek and French studies 
have been examined. 
The content of the present data collection form does not differ substantially 
from the content of the forms in the other studies. However, the structure is some-
what different and the form used in the present study comprises fewer entries. On 
the other hand a large number of keywords and examples are given. 
The completed forms for the selected cases are brought in appendix A. 
Table 1. Data collection form 
Type of information Keywords, examples 
1. General Information 11 Date 
12Time 
1.3 Place 
1 4 Act1v1ty type Chemical process plant, 
chemical warehouse, rail 
transport, ship transport, road 
transport... 
1.5 Name of company 
1 6 Topology Characterization of land 
surrounding the accident site, 
population density ... 
1. 7 Description of buildings, 
train wagons etc. 
1 8 Regulations involved EEC directive on "Major 
Accident Hazards of CertaJn 
Industrial Activities", 
international transport 
regulattons. 
1.9 Accident preparedness Safety analysis carried out, 
external and internal emer-
gency response plan, staff 
and equipment available for 
emergency response, 
monitors installed and/or 
avatlable 
1 10 Information to the public General information, emer-
prior to the accident gency instructions ... 
(Table continued on next page.) 
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Table 2. Data collection form, continued 
Type of information Keywords, examples 
2. The accident 2.1 Accident type Liquid release, gaseous 
release, fire, chemical de-
composition, deflagration, 
detonation, BLEVE. Toxic/-
flammable ... 
2.2 Substance(s) involved Name, CAS-no., involved 
mass, toxicity, mode of 
storage ... 
2.3 Other substances at the Gases, liquids. Toxic/flam-
site mable ... 
3. Accident course 3. 1 Weather conditions Wind direction, wind speed, 
temperature, humidity, stability 
class ... 
3.2. Detection of accident How the accident was 
detected, time of detection, 
time of alarming, with-
in/outside working hours, 
day/night... 
3.3 Description of accident Event sequence ... 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff 
and management 
3.5 Behaviour of the public 
4. Emergency measures 4.1 Emergency services in- Fire brigade (public/local), 
volved police, health service, number 
of persons ... 
4.2 Emergency actions Fire fighting, rescue ... 
4.3 Equipment used Fire nozzles, fire engines ... 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive Protection of computer 
damage systems, disposal of polluted 
fire fighting water ... 
4.5 Medical treatment of 
victims 
4.6 Care for the plant staff 
4.7 Care for the public Evacuation, information on 
safe behaviour ... 
5. Cause of accident 5.1 Primary cause Human error, component 
failure, natural event... 
5.2 Underlying causes Managerial/organizational 
omissions, design inadequ-
acy ... 
6. Consequences of acc1dent 6.1 Actual number of persons 
killed 
6.2 Actual number of persons 
injured 
6.3 Economic losses 
6.4 Environmental effects Effects on plants, grass, fish, 
ground water, lakes, rivers ... 
6.5 Map of area affected 
6.6 Potential harm to humans Potential number of persons 
and the environment killed or injured, potential pol-
lution of rivers, lakes, ground 
water ... 
(Table continued on next page.) 
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Table 3. Data collection form, continued 
Type of information Keywords, examples 
7. Post incident actions 7.1 Plant modifications 
7.2 Recommendations 
7 3 Precautions taken to Pollution of soil, rivers, ground 
prevent or limit consequences water, structural damage ... 
7.4 Does dangerous Situation 
still ex1st? 
7.5 Post incident investiga-
tions 
7.6 Information to the public 
7.7 Emergency management, Collaboration between 
lessons learnt authorities, revision of 
emergency plans, revision of 
mitigation equipment. .. 
7.8 Authority requirements Installation of spill basins, 
safety valves ... 
7.9 Initiated research Development of improved 
consequence models, 
improved protection equip-
ment .. 
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5 Emergency organization 
In the following, an account is given of the organization valid in the accident 
period considered. In the beginning of 1993 the Danish emergency organizations 
were changed from a system with independency between civil defence forces and 
fire brigades into a more integrated system. The planned modifications are 
sketched briefly in section 5.3. 
Traditionally, there are separate emergency organizations for performing the 
following functions: 
• Fire fighting. 
• Police work. 
• Ambulance transport. 
• Civil defence. 
The first three organizations have been designed and operated for peacetime appli-
cations, whereas civil defence forces could be viewed as the wartime supplement 
increasing the power of fire brigades and ambulance services and adding special 
services for specific war incidents. During greater accidents and on occasions 
where the ordinary mitigation forces were occupied, civil defence forces have 
been called upon to assist the fire brigades. 
In 1974, a step towards integration was taken, when plans were developed for 
emergency actions in case of accidents involving chemical substances, pollution 
etc. These plans operated with three emergency levels: 
• On the lowest level, the fire brigade performs the actions necessary with 
rather simple means. 
• On an intermediate level, the fire brigade uses special equipment and protec-
tion in order to handle dangerous substances. 
• On the highest level, civil defence forces are mobilized. 
All fire stations are equipped for the lowest level response and approximately 50 
fire stations can operate on the next level, too. 
Information support systems were developed with descriptions, precautions and 
handling procedures for the most common dangerous substances, and besides 
written information, a 24 hours telephone service was organized with a pharma-
ceutical expert on duty. Today several information sources are available for che-
mical emergencies in Denmark: 
• Safety cards for road transport (CEFIC-cards). 
• Handbook for emergency response leaders. 
• Chemical emergency response service, 24 hours telephone service. 
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• Poison information centre on the National University Hospital. 
• Police data bases. 
The chemical response service was opened in 1974 by the civil defence authorities 
in collaboration with the Royal Danish School of Pharmacy in Copenhagen and 
has served both fire brigades, police, military, civil defence, Danish State 
Railways, doctors and hospitals in case of chemical emergencies. The expert on 
duty has informed on dangerous and toxic effects and precautions, he has analysed 
samples from the emergency site, and identified the chemical contents in products 
and unlabelled substances. From 1990 the service was changed, so that the infor-
mation service is open mainly to officers in fire brigade and police, whereas the 
analytical service is still open for the same group of users as before. 
The poison information centre is a 24 hours telephone service for doctors, 
nurses and related personnel, giving advice on the treatment of patients who have 
been exposed to chemicals or chemical products. 
Most emergencies are handled by fire brigades with assistance from ambulance 
services and police as required, with a fire brigade officer as the chief-in-com-
mand at the accident site. 
Figure 1 shows the structure of the Danish emergency organization in case of a 
major accident. When emergency actions imply the use of command centres and 
involves such things as large-scale evacuations, coordination with several hospi-
tals, etc. the command structure is as follows: 
• The leading police officer is emergency leader and coordinates actions of fire 
brigades, ambulance services and hospitals etc. 
-
Assisting 
Forces 
gJ: 
e· 0• 
LL· 
C:' 
~: 
Fire Com-
mander 
Fire 
Service 
.... 1011111 
Chief 
Coordinator 
. ·_> .. '':_.._ ', ·------~ 
. . . \ 
· ..• ·· .. :·----.·~ 
. ''~~ 
' . . 
Rescue Civil Defen 
Companies ce Forces 
Scene of Accident ... I 
Figure 1. Structure of emergency organization for a major accident 
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• The leading fire brigade officer is in command of all operations at the acci-
dent site. 
Fire brigades and police forces are organised and administered locally, on district 
level, both covered by rules and regulation by the Ministry of Justice, whereas the 
civil defence organization relates to the Ministry of the Interior. Ambulance ser-
vices in Denmark are with four exceptions (Copenhagen, Frederiksberg, Gentofte 
and Roskilde) operated by a private company (Falck) which has contracts with the 
local administrations. In several cases, also the fire brigades are operated by the 
private Falck. The "National Fire Inspectorate" has worked out rules and standards 
and performed education of fire brigade officers and made inspection of forces 
and equipment. The central law is the "Fire Act" of 1976, with job specifications 
and command rules detailed in "Instruction for Fire Commanders", 1983. Specific 
instructions include: 
• Response to chemical accidents on land. 
• Guidelines for accident response. 
• Instruction/guidelines for transport accidents. 
• Guidelines for the contingency of fire brigades. 
Special medical emergency organizations are not developed, as hospitals are 
already using all resources most of the time, so only minor modifications can be 
found that are specifically directed towards accident situations. One such element 
is the medical team sent to the accident site, when many persons are injured or the 
handling of victims is delicate, like injured persons trapped in collided transport 
vehicles, or groups of people exposed to dangerous substances, requiring a first 
screening to save ambulance capacity. Special communication schemes for 
dealing with visitation and coordination in the bigger cities are also set up. During 
visitation, patients are distributed to the different hospitals from an accidents site 
after a short medical evaluation, considering both the patient needs, hospital capa-
cities and transport delays. 
5.1 Emergency organizations on factory level 
Local fire brigades are organized in airports, oil refineries and other plants, where 
adequate reactions demand an immediate response by locally trained forces. Local 
fire brigades are dimensioned and educated in close collaboration with the public 
fire brigades. 
Plants where dangerous substances are processed, handled or stored are 
required to keep the public fire administrations informed on: 
• Which substances are dealt with. 
• Amounts stored and processed. 
• Plant lay-out. 
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• Plant organization. 
• Access route, communications etc. 
This information is necessary for the fire administration in order to perform regu-
lation and inspection, and they form the basis for special arrangements with alarm 
lines to the public fire brigade or special equipment or education. For instance 
there are a few storage facilities for ammonia (used in farming as a fertilizing 
agent), where direct alarm lines are connected to the public fire brigade which is 
supposed to react in case of ammonia release. Personnel on the storage facility is 
too scarce to form an emergency corps. 
Generally it has been preferred to rely on the public fire brigades, as their 
response times are below 10 minutes in urban areas and below 15 minutes else-
where, the critical points are therefore: 
• Access to the plant. 
• Updated knowledge for the fire brigade, on substances, precautions and plant 
topology. 
• Contact persons under emergency. 
The Civil Defence Act has required all working places employing more than 75 
persons to have organized local civil defence units that can be activated in case of 
war, to protect employees and working facilities. Where such organizations have 
been made, they are in possession of materials and equipment that may be useful 
even under peacetime accidents. 
5.2 Training, drills and exercises 
Drills and exercises are part of the basic emergency education, and drills are 
arranged regularly, both at the public emergency corps and at the local fire brig-
ades in the industry. The minimum frequencies have been prescribed by the na-
tional "National Fire Inspectorate", as well as the themes to be rehearsed. Also the 
police forces carry out drills regularly. 
The quality of drills and exercises conducted by industrial fire brigades depends 
on the responsible management, and some industrial organizations give low prior-
ity to the emergency exercise subject. The different attitudes to emergency pre-
paredness partly reflect different attitudes to safety matters in general in different 
branches of industry, but sometimes attitudes are also seen to follow changes in 
ownership. 
The proceedings edited by Gow and Kay (op.cit.) include some papers on the 
exercise issue, that touch upon both the need for more large exercises and possible 
means for planning and analyzing exercises. Neuhoff (1987) presents the practical 
difficulties clearly, and mentions shortly the antidote administration problem 
(compare the Nrestved case, section 6.7 below). Max-Lino et al (1987) 
recommend a mixture of "high fidelity" exercises and functional analysis to be 
used in the assessment of emergency plans, where the functional analysis can 
supplement the exercises and take over in regions, where high fidelity exercises 
cannot be tolerated. Risp has some experience using cause consequence diagrams 
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as a planning tool in the arrangement of emergency exercises. These diagrams are 
useful for presenting and administrating both possible event patterns and possible 
communication flows, time delays etc. This facilitates pointing out the trouble 
centres, possible communication overflow, and the best observation posts on 
beforehand. It is also a useful presentation for selecting the points (time, space) 
most suitable for intervention to control or stimulate the game (0velsen pA Be-
handlingsstationen, 1976). 
There seems to be a need both to develop tools for planning and evaluating 
emergency exercises and to motivate responsible key persons to take the emerg-
ency exercise and the derived recommendations more seriously. Improved tools 
can improve the exercise work, but maybe only the accidents influence motiv-
ation? 
5.3 Planned changes of emergency organizations 
From 1993, i.e. after the period considered in this report, the emergency organiz-
ation in Denmark is being changed towards a more integrated structure. The most 
important change is the closer relation between fire brigades and civil defence, 
that earlier operated as separate organizations with rather limited collaboration in 
the daily work. Inspirations to the change can be seen in the American FEMA and 
in the Swedish "Raddningsverket", but actual motivations have been changes in 
the prospects of war, together with a general need for higher efficiency in public 
enterprises in general. Background information for the decision to restructure the 
emergency organizations can be found in Katastofeberedskab (1991). The primary 
changes are: 
• The formation of an "Emergency Management Agency" uniting the earlier 
Civil Defence Authority and the Fire Inspectorate. 
• The responsibility for fire safety and mitigation is thereby moved from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of the Interior. 
• After the basic education. all education and training is common for fire brig-
ade and civil defence personnel. 
• The local fire brigades gain immediate access to civil defence material and 
equipment. 
The Emergency Management Agency is organised with eleven operational 
branches: 
• Organisations for peacetime emergencies. 
• Regulation of emergency organisations. 
• Organisations for war time emergencies. 
• Nuclear regulatory authority. 
• Disaster prevention. 
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• Personnel. 
• Education. 
• Logistics. 
• Planning and economics. 
• Administration. 
• Chemicallaboratory. 
This structure has been described in Brandvrern (1993, no.5), where the tasks of 
every branch are listed. The picture reflects both the intention to make a new start, 
and the intention to keep things running with the same staff and experts. The 
agency's unit for peacetime emergencies will be a national authority on emergency 
planning and coordination of the local emergency organisations, the hospitals' 
emergency organisations and large drills and exercises etc. The unit for regulation 
of emergency organisations works with dimensioning and requirements and 
supervises the local emergency organisations, but the office also has associated 
issues like water supplies, alarm planning and personnel on duty schemes. It 
probably means a large step forward, i.e. fire brigades, civil defence and hospital 
contingencies are now related to one central authority in emergency matters, but 
collaboration is still needed on environment issues, police matters and military 
assistance. 
Future emergency plans and actions will also reflect changes in the EEC Direc-
tive on Major Industrial Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities. In the past, most 
emphasis in emergency preparation has been put on fire safety, alarm systems and 
meeting plans. Rather few industrial sites have been objects for public information 
on potential dangers and appropriate emergency rules, communicated to nearby 
residents as a general precaution. Sharpened focus on that matter in article 8 of 
Directive 82/501 leads to more regular information activities of this kind and will 
probably also have the police playing a more active part in future emergency 
planning. 
5.4 Regulatory authorities 
Emergency planning and emergency actions are controlled by different authorities 
according to both type of production/storage involved and type of accident site. 
The safety of production and storage plants is regulated by the National Agency 
of Environmental Protection and the National Labour Inspection. Internal emerg-
ency planning is considered an occupational safety issue, and risk control - which 
is also a means for pollution control - is at the same time part of the environment 
protection. 
Handling and storage of flammable or highly reactive substances and explosives 
are regulated by the fire authorities, who also perform regulation and control of 
fire safety in building construction, storage and siting, operation and maintenance 
etc. The necessary special arrangements, equipment and mitigation plans are 
prepared by the fire authorities in collaboration with the involved 
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owners/operators. The fire authorities belong to the domain of the new Emergency 
Management Agency. 
External emergency plans for accidents at an industrial site are the responsibil-
ity of the police. Therefore, up to four different authorities, belonging to three 
ministries, can have their shares of emergency planning for an actual industrial 
plant. 
Oil and gas production in Denmark takes place off-shore also, and the risk 
issues including emergency operations at sea are regulated by the Energy Agency. 
Environmental protection operations in connection with such emergencies are 
under regulation by the National Agency of Environmental Protection. 
The transport area is covered by special international conventions and intro-
duces two further ministries to our subject, chemical emergencies. 
• Road accidents are treated by the so-called ADR convention, European A-
greement Concerning the International Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Road. 
• Railway accidents are covered by RID, Reglement concernant le transport 
international ferroviaire des marchandise dangereuses, with a Danish supple-
ment, RID A. 
• Sea transport accidents are treated by the IMDG code, with Danish supple-
ments. 
• Air transport accidents are treated by ICAO, especially ICAO TI, Technical 
Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air. 
In addition to the Ministry of Justice and from 1993 the Ministry of the Interior, 
the following ministries are relevant for traffic accidents: the Traffic Ministry, for 
road, railway and air accidents, and the Industry Ministry for sea accidents. 
5.5 Reorganizing for emergency 
An accident type, that may in general activate several organizations, is the chemi-
cal accident at sea. According to Katastrofeberedskab (1991) p. 39 the National 
Agency of Environmental Protection is responsible for the emergency operations 
and collaborates with a branch of the marine (SOK) on operations at sea, and with 
civil defence units on fighting pollution in waters closer to the shore. As pollution 
reaches land areas, the responsibility for fighting pollution moves to the fire brig-
ade officer on duty, and the operations are conducted by workers from the local 
administration, by hired entrepreneurs or by the same civil defence units as before. 
In cases with severe character or extension, the minister for the environment can 
decide that the National Agency of Environmental Protection directs all ope-
rations. 
This construction is simplified by the closer relations from 1993 between fire 
brigade and civil defence, but a representative of the National Agency of Envi-
ronmental Protection heading the operations will still get a difficult job. Both this 
rather special accident type and the more common case with a large emergency, 
where the police is conducting all emergency operations, are examples of necess-
ary adjustments with built in weaknesses. New managers and coordinators are 
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introduced for very obvious reasons: the job grows and the scope is broadened, but 
troubles may arise, when the prescribed new managers are not professional 
emergency operators. As difficulties may arise typically at the interface between 
the emergency units and the extraordinaire "external" leader, this collaboration 
must be rehearsed frequently with all relevant personnel. 
A sound emergency organization has power, flexibility and control built in on 
all levels in order to be operational and efficient. The military spirit is cultivated 
with uniforms, ranks and strict rules, just as education and training are based on 
military traditions. Civil servants and politicians are usually working in environ-
ments with other sorts of communication and different dynamics of operations, 
one therefore needs very demanding accidents or rather extensive emergency 
drills and exercises before one is able to evaluate the collaboration in the larger 
organization schemes. 
The seven cases of this study did not expose the integral emergency 
organisation to a real life test like for instance the French case from Nantes 1987 
(Lequime & Brette, 1993). By that occasion, an NPK-fire caused a large scale 
evacuation to be carried out, and the French report emphasizes the extremely 
important role played by the mayors and their personnel in evacuation and recep-
tion of the displaced people. It would be of interest to study real life experience 
with orders flowing from mayors and representatives of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agencies etc. into fire brigades and other operational units in an emergency 
situation. Exercises with higher level command structures are often conducted 
using simulated operations, and cannot reveal adverse effects on the interface to 
the practical units. 
The detailed arrangement of such collaboration and coordination may differ 
between countries with differently structured administrations and different tradi-
tions, so both the citizen and the fire officer may react differently to a mayor's 
order in different European countries. 
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6 Case Stories 
6.1 Dansk Sojakagefabrik 
Early in the night, 15 July, 1980, Copenhagen experienced the largest explosion 
since World War II. An industrial company processing vegetable fats, "Dansk 
Sojakagefabrik", included an extraction plant, which was destroyed in an 
explosion leading to broken windows in central Copenhagen in distances of sev-
eral hundreds metres. 
The source of accident was an extraction process using a light type petrol 
(hexane), which was retrieved afterwards by distillation in a toaster. The operation 
crew had some troubles controlling the process temperature, and therefore 
increased heat supply to the toaster. The smell of petrol grew to such an extent, 
that the staff had to leave the extraction plant. The first alarm message to the 
public Alarm Centre at the fire station came from a bus driver passing the prem-
ises of the plant, who stated, that "airplane fuel was spilled on the road in front of 
Dansk Sojakagefabrik". 
The explosion occurred half an hour later, after an attempt to tum off the elec-
tric power supply to the extraction plant. Material losses were enormous, and 
many persons suffered severe bums on hands and faces. However, there were no 
fatalities. It has been assumed, that approximately 40 tonnes of hexane was burn-
ing immediately after the explosion. 
The accident was caused by an unlucky combination of operation difficulties 
and what seems to be decision errors. The actions are not reflecting the condition, 
that afterwards was ascribed the leading role in the release of evaporated hexane: 
the displaced "safety bell". This item was constructed to serve as an overpressure 
relief component, but it is supposed, that for some reason it did not settle correctly 
after a relief, and thereafter allowed a continuous leak of evaporated hexane. 
The case raises some questions: 
• The adequacy of the technical knowledge of fire officers. 
• A comment on a delicate balance: who is actually controlling the plant, when 
fire mitigation forces have arrived? 
• Were emergency plans and alarm systems up to date before the accident? 
Description of the event sequence 
At 0.17 am, 15 July 1980, the first alarm message was received by the alarm 
centre of the Main Fire Station of Copenhagen, 1 kilometre driving distance from 
the accident place. It was delivered by a public bus driver, who had been warned 
about the petrol vapours. He informed the alarm centre that airplane fuel had been 
spilled on Islands Brygge (street name) outside Dansk Sojakagefabrik. The Fire 
Station sent one fire engine without alarm hom and light activated (night time, 
moderate traffic and low alarm classification). 
The fire engine was stopped at a certain distance from the plant due to the infor-
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mation about petrol vapours, and the fire commander on duty approaches by feet. 
After contacting the operation crew, he calls the chief fire commander. 
At approximately 0.35 am the chief fire commander arrives. He calls two more 
fire engines and he declares No Admittance to the area. 
The plant management has arrived and the chief fire commander asks for igni-
tion sources to be removed, which includes shutting off the electricity to the 
extraction plant at the main transformers. The department head thereafter makes a 
contact to the power control unit, where the leader on duty rejects to tum off the 
two transformers under load due to spark risks. As he thereafter turned off one of 
the three transformers connected to the extraction, plant, a sudden fire was 
observed outside the extraction plant, this fire was supposed to have an extent of 
approximately 3 m3• It has not been documented, whether the disconnected line 
was actually loaded or "unloaded" at the time. 
At 0.47.30 am a violent explosion came, that destroyed the extraction plant and 
nearby buildings, that gave some persons serious bums, but did not cause fatal-
ities. According to the reporting in Brandvrem (Petersen, 1981), the explosion 
occurred after the order was given to tum off electricity supply, but the exact time 
pattern between the explosion and the disconnection of the power can not be 
found. No matter what the exact times were, the explosion could have been caused 
by another event than switching off the main current. 
Following the explosion, 40 tonnes of hexane took fire and there was a large 
roof fire and some minor fires. There was a common fear of new explosions to 
occur in addition. 
Immediately after the explosion, the chauffeur of the fire chief in command 
called the alarm centre for enforcement. More fire engines (whole Fire Station H) 
were sent together with 8 ambulances. 
The Alarm Centre was drowned with alarms due to the violent nature of the 
e?'plosion, and the distant effects: broken windows in apartment houses and in 
shops etc. The public alarm telephone line "000" broke down. 
The Alarm Centre acted according to plans and informed: 
• Central Visitating Unit for the capital's hospitals. 
• Copenhagen Harbour Administration. 
• Falck's Ambulance Service. 
• Leading Fire Chief I Vice Leading Fire Chief. 
Approximately 0.58 am the first report from the fire chief in command at the fire 
scene came: 
• No account of the situation is given. 
• More assistance is required. 
• Request for a command post to be established. 
At 1.11 an additional fire station (Adelgade) was called. 
At 1.41 am the Alarm Centre received the second report from the fire place, this 
time including an account of the situation. 
Approximately 3.30 am an overview was made, showing no fatalities. 
At 4.00 am, the first crew of firemen was shifted, and on 16 July around 3 pm -
40 hours after the first alarm was received, the last firemen left the accident place. 
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Lessons learnt 
The first alarm message "airplane fuel spilled on the road" originated from a 
public bus driver and gave no very precise information on the situation. The mess-
age was sent by the bus driver as a traffic warning to the bus centre, where they 
relayed the information to the police radio service, who finally reported the spilled 
airplane fuel to the public alarm centre. The first reaction from the fire brigade 
was therefore a moderate one, approaching the site very cautiously, parking the 
fire engine on safe distance and walking the last hundreds of meters. After making 
observations at the site, they alarmed the brigade officer on duty, who arrived 
approximately 12 minutes before the explosion. 
Thorough investigations by the occupational safety authorities and the police 
have pointed out several factors leading to a condition with extraordinary amounts 
of hexane vapours, creating the potential for a large explosion. However, exact 
details on the initiating factor of the explosion are difficult to obtain. A discussion 
took place between the brigade officer on duty and representatives from the plant 
management on means to stop the emission of hexane and avoid fire/explosion. It 
was decided to stop electricity supply to the plant in order to remove ignition 
sources. Three supply transformers lead to the extraction plant and only one was 
unloaded at the time. The power line operator refused to disconnect the lines actu-
ally loaded, as he feared the formation of sparks due to electrical inductance in 
transformers, motors etc. Both the investigation of the occupational safety author-
ities and reports from fire brigade representatives state that the explosion came at 
the time, where the operator actually tried to tum one of the three supply lines off. 
It is unclear, if this line was under load or "unloaded". Electrical installations in 
the extraction plant were made explosion proof, but hexane vapours had spread to 
nearby areas and buildings with ordinary installations. 
The dilemma obviously was, that an urgent need for stopping the emission of 
vapours was contradicted by the risk of creating a spark when electrical power 
was disconnected. An emergency shut down procedure seems not to have existed 
for the extraction plant. To disconnect an unloaded transformer might seem a safe 
operation at first sight, but turning off an unloaded supply line could never in the 
first term implement the intended effect, that was to remove energy. A gradual 
reduction of energy supply to the plant would be preferable, but this alternative 
may not have been relevant, as it would imply operations at the plant area. 
The fire brigade officer is responsible for the emergency operations at the acci-
dent site and these include actions initiated at the involved plant and equipment in 
order to control the threat. But the officer in command always has to rely strongly 
upon the site personnel and company representatives, as long as there is a plant to 
control. 
The technical knowledge and experience of a fire brigade officer may vary con-
siderably when it comes to operations on industrial equipment. Plant representa-
tives may feel the threat from an approaching disaster and at the same time they 
are not used to taking orders from an external person. The scenario at a plant with 
boiling hexane and a leaking safety valve is worth a close analysis in order to 
produce useful advice on: 
• How deep in the structure and function shall the officer try to control the 
decisions? 
• On which level (in which operational domain) should ordered actions be 
formulated? 
In the terms of the hexane case there is a spectrum for choice, from "reduce heat-
ing" to "tum power line x off'. 
21 
6.2 Mustard gas bombs 
While trawling at a location near Gotland, a Faroeish cutter caught a mustard gas 
bomb. This resulted in serious injuries to the seven crew members who had not 
been fully aware of the risk of catching chemical ammunition within certain areas 
of the Baltic Sea. The accident was the most serious one that has occurred since 
large amounts of chemical ammunition were dumped into the sea around Denmark 
fifty years ago. 
Description of event sequence 
The following description of the event sequence is based on information material 
received from the Danish navy (S~vrernets Min~rtjeneste, Holmen) and the Emer-
gency Management Agency. 
In the afternoon on Thursday the 22. March 1984, a Faroeish cutter caught a 
mustard gas bomb in the trawl while it was fishing near Gotland. The trawl was 
emptied and the content was by a conveyer belt brought below the deck where 
some of the crew members started to cut the fish open. It was noticed that the 
quarterdeck was contaminated with a greenish liquid and that jelly-like lumps 
were spread among the fish. It was also noticed that an object had been caught, but 
nobody suspected that it could be a bomb from which mustard gas was leaking 
out. 
Not until three of the crew members below the deck showed poisoning symp-
toms, the unknown object was identified as being a mustard gas bomb. An illus-
tration of the bomb was found in the Danish yearbook for fishermen. An emerg-
ency call was then received by R~nne radio in Bornholm and the Swedish life-
saving service. The three intoxicated fishermen were then picked up by helicop-
ters and brought to a hospital in Gotland. 
As the remaining four crew members had no symptoms they tried to reach 
Bornholm, but after some time they all became blind and had to give up. After 
having sent an emergency call they were also transported by helicopters to the 
Swedish hospital. 
However, the correct treatment could not be given at this hospital and all the 
fishermen were therefore transferred to a Danish hospital (Hvidovre hospital near 
Copenhagen) where the injuries - blindness and severe 'burnings' of hands and 
legs- could be treated correctly. They all recovered after 1 - 2 weeks. 
The Danish navy is responsible for disablement of chemical ammunition being 
caught by Danish, Faroeish or Greenland fishermen. The cutter that was left 
empty on the sea, was therefore boarded by a sapper team from the naval district 
of Bornholm (at 05.30 the 23. March) and taken in tow to the port of R~nne (the 
towing lasted 15 hours). Here a safety zone was established by throwing a cordon 
round the ship. 
The ship, trawl and movables were decontaminated by the civil defence and the 
military. This work lasted 6 days before the control tracking indicated that every-
thing had been cleaned completely. 
Lessons learnt 
The lessons learnt from the mustard gas bomb accident are given below: 
• The detection of the released mustard gas was late because the fishermen did 
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not immediately identify the caught object as being a mustard gas bomb and 
because mustard gas has a delayed action effect varying from 1 to 48 hours to 
the onset of symptoms. Comment: After the accident the information material 
has been improved and courses for fishermen are being held regularly. This 
has apparently had an effect on the alertness of the fishermen. No serious 
accidents have occurred since this accident. In most cases mustard gas 
ammunition is now being detected before the trawl is emptied. 
• There was no first-aid kit for treatment of injuries caused by mustard gas in 
the cutter. According to a national regulation from 1970, fishing boats, which 
are trawling within certain areas of the Baltic Sea, shall be provided with 
such first-aid kits. 
• The Swedish emergency resources for mustard gas accidents were limited. 
The helicopters which picked up the first three men could not supply the 
fishermen who remained on the ship with first-aid kits and breathing appar-
atus. 
• The leader of the decontamination team stated in the log that the decontami-
nation work was difficult because equipment for effective detection of mus-
tard gas and DS 2 were not available. (DS 2 is a blend of chemical substances 
which is used for breaking down the mustard gas. Since the DS 2 vapours are 
toxic and skin contact can cause cauterization, protective clothing and 
breathing apparatus are used). 
6.3 Nordisk Alkali Biokemi 
The accident occurred at the company Nordisk Alkali Biokemi (NAB). Approxi-
mately 200 kg of the fungicide Orthocide 83 (83 % captan - N-trichloromethyl-
thiotetrahydrophthalimide) was decomposed releasing hydrogen chloride and 
sulphur dioxide. No acute health effects to people in the neighbourhood were 
observed. 
The activities at the plant comprised mixing, diluting, repackaging and distribu-
ting solid and liquid pesticides. None of the substances were synthesized at the 
plant. Normally about 50 tons of raw chemical compounds, 50 tons of manufac-
tured goods, and 20 m3 of various organic solvents were stored at the plant. 
The company was covered by the CEC directive 82/501/EEC on "Major Acci-
dent Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities" as more than a specific amount of a 
number of pesticides were handled which according to the directive may lead to 
major accident hazards. 
It may be added that the company recently has been closed. 
Information on the accident has been obtained from discussions with S. Thorup, 
Copenhagen fire brigade. 
Description of the event sequence 
An employee observed a white chemical cloud from one of the buildings at 7.30 
pm on Sunday 14.04.1985. He then alarmed the fire brigade and the management 
of the company. 
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It was observed that the toxic gases were released from a silo containing about 
200 kg of the fungicide Orthocide 83. Furthermore, it was observed that the stirrer 
in the silo was running. It is probable that the stirrer had done so since the night 
before and that heat evolving from friction had initiated a decomposition of the 
chemical compound. The thermal decomposition of captan is an exothermal pro-
cess, i.e. heat is produced. 
The fire brigade used water as cooling agent in order to stop the decomposition. 
The content of the silo (i.e. water, Orthocide 83, decomposition products) was 
then transferred to drums for later transport to a chemical waste treatment plant. 
Furthermore, samples were taken of the content of the silo for later chemical 
analysis in order to clarify the event sequence. 
During the operations the fire brigade had to use breathing apparatus and pro-
tective clothing. 
Due to corrosion of machinery at the plant caused by the released acid cleaning 
with large amounts of water was finally carried out. The water contaminated with 
acid was discharged to the sewer system. This action was carried out in agreement 
with the environmental authorities. 
Later chemical analyses of the samples from the silo confirmed that a 
polymerization had occurred and that the gases released were mainly hydrogen 
chloride and sulphur dioxide. The incident was probably a decomposition com-
bined with a smouldering fire. The maximum possible amounts of released gases 
were 70 kg HCI and 20 kg S02• Even if these amounts of gases were released in a 
relatively short period (e.g. 60 min.) no acute health effects to people in the 
neighbourhood would occur. 
Lessons learnt 
The most important point observed in this accident relates to the breathing appara-
tus used by the fire brigade. 
The equipment is always inspected after use, and it was by this occasion 
observed, that the parts of the equipment made of metal were corroded. This 
corrosion was caused by exposure of the equipment to acids. However, even if the 
concentrations of the actual acids had been larger or the exposure time had been 
longer it is not expected that problems to the firemen would have occurred. On 
other occasions with different acids, these effects may lead to drastic con-
sequences, therefore some general observations are made: 
• No real good protective clothing to be used by the firemen in relation to 
chemical fires exists. It would be desirable to develop clothing, which could 
protect the firemen against chemical exposure as well as heat. 
• Parts of the breathing apparatus made by plastic materials could be affected 
by released chemicals. 
• The equipment will only be checked immediately after use. No periodical 
inspection is carried out. This means that chemical effects to the equipment 
occuring later will not be seen. 
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6.4 Valdemar Larsen Metal Working 
The accident involved a release of chlorine from a metal and casting factory. The 
production comprised aluminium melting in three foundry furnaces at 800-100 oc. 
The capacity of one of the furnaces was 20 tons/charge and the capacity of each of 
the two other furnaces was 6 tons/charge. Chlorine was used to remove mag-
nesium from the melt. 
Information on the accident has been obtained from the MARS data base and 
other documents available by the Danish authorities. 
Description of event sequence 
The accident took place on Thursday 25 April 1985. Even though some occupants 
were actually working at the plant when the release occurred, it was a person who 
passed the plant and smelled chlorine, that alarmed the police at 5.43 pm. When 
the police arrived, the fire brigade was immediately alarmed. 
The police sealed off the area and initiated a warning of the public via the radio. 
People were instructed to remain indoor and close doors and windows. The bus 
routes were also changed. 
The chlorine was leaking from a 500 kg drum. In total 2 drums were present at 
the plant. The drums were placed in a special chlorine room. The leaking drum 
was connected to the chlorinating facility. A hot water spray was in operation in 
order to facilitate the evaporation of the chlorine (the liquid chlorine is evaporting 
when released from the drum. Evaporation of chlorine requires large amounts of 
heat and the temperature of the liquid chlorine will therefore rapidly decrease and 
the evaporation rate will therefore also decrease). The accidental release took 
place via the valve at the drum. The bushing was loose and the stem had thereby 
been ejected causing a rapid relase to the surroundings. 
The stem was connected to a handle outside the chlorine room to make an 
emergency shut down of the valve possible in case of release of chlorine from 
hoses and tubes. However, since the stem was not fitted at all such a shut down 
procedure would not be possible. 
The fire brigade (fire men with breathing apparatus) located the point of release, 
stopped the hot water spray system and found and refitted the bushing and valve 
stem thus stopping the release of chorine. 
The release of chlorine was terminated approximately at 7.20 pm. The area was 
re-opened at 7.35 pm. 
Four staff members, three police men and a fire man were hospitalized for 24 
hours. No permanent injuries were observed. 
It was demonstrated later, that the cause of the accident apparently was incor-
rect handling of the chlorine drum by one of the staff members working in the 
chlorine room. The valve stem and the bushing had been unscrewed by force 
thereby overriding the locking provided by a screw. After unscrewing the bushing 
and valve stem were ejected and the chlorine was released. In total approximately 
160 kg chlorine was released. 
It was estimated that the concentration of chlorine immediately outside the plant 
was approximately 6-20 ppm. 
25 
Lessons learnt 
Two lessons should be emphasized in relation to the accident at Valdemar Larsen 
Metal Working: 
• Written instructions for handling of the valve at the chlorine drums were 
available. However, the workers present at the time of the accident were all 
foreigners and language problems may have contributed to the accident. The 
workers' level of education is inadequate under the circumstances. 
• The people living in the area complained that they were only warned via the 
radio and not by loudspeaker vans. 
6.5 Matas warehouse fire 
The fire occurred at the Matas warehouse in Brabrand. A large number of differ-
ent products were involved in the fire (e.g. soap, cosmetics, pesticides, solvents). 
The fire and the fire fighting were rather traditional, however, the discharge of 
contaminated fire fighting water turned out to be a problem. 
The accident is described by Eriksen (1988) and Lindgaard-Jfi)rgensen (1989). 
Description of the event sequence 
On Sunday 5 June 1988 at 5.49 pm the fire brigade was called for a fire at the 
Matas central warehouse in Brabrand. The size of the building was approximately 
3000 m3• In the warehouse various products were stored, e.g. soap, cosmetics, 
pesticides, solvents and different packaging materials. The fire brigade did not 
have any detailed knowledge on the type and amount of products. 
About 2 km from the site a large residential area was situated. The police initi-
ated warning of the local population through radio and television to close doors 
and windows and remain indoor. Initially a large flame lift was observed, later, 
when then extinguishing was carried out, the plume came closer to ground level. 
Therefore, the population was informed that doors and windows should be kept 
closed until the next morning. The warnings did not have very much effect since a 
large number of people came to the fire site in order to watch what was going on. 
The main problem was the large amount of fire fighting water contaminated 
with chemicals and soap. No spill basins to collect the fire fighting water were 
available. The total amount of water released was approximately 1000 m3• Due to 
the large amount of soap in the water the pH value was quite high. 
If nothing had been done the contaminated water would be discharged to a 
stream and via a pond and a lake to a small river. The lake and the small river had 
a high ecological classification and actions should be taken in order to protect 
them. In collaboration with the local environmental authorities the fire brigade 
decided to transfer part of the fire fighting water to the biological waste water 
treatment plant via the sewer system. Furthermore, additional water was led to the 
stream in order to dilute the contaminated fire fighting water. 
The next day death fish were found in the pond but not in the lake and the small 
river. Obviously, the actions taken had not been sufficient to obtain a neutral pH-
value and an acceptable oxygen content in the water. Minor effects at the bio-
logical waste water treatment plant were also observed. 
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Lessons learnt 
The Matas warehouse fire has shown that even fire fighting water from fires in 
warehouses involving quite harmless chemical substances could give rise to sub-
stantial short term effects in the environment. However, it seems difficult for 
ecotoxicologists to predict the environmental consequences of such releases. 
It is observed, that: 
• It could be necessary for the fire brigade to limit the amount of water to be 
used for fire fighting. 
• Not only streams, lakes, rivers etc. but also the ground water could be con-
taminated with the fire fighting water if the water is spilled on the ground. 
• Waste water treatment plants could be affected if the fire fighting water is 
discharged to the sewer system. 
• The local fire brigade should have more knowledge on the substances stored 
in the Matas type warehouses. 
• Preventive measures should be taken in order to collect the fire fighting water 
from fires in chemical warehouses if a sensitive recipient is threatened. 
The volumes of warehouses increase and a large number of different substances 
are often stored together. More specific rules for organization of storages for large 
amounts of relatively harmless chemicals (such as mixed storages of soap, cos-
metics, solvents and pesticides) are needed. 
6.6 Maribo Seeds Company 
A fire occurred at the storage plant of Maribo Seeds in Holeby involving a storage 
of insecticides and fungicides. In fighting the fire a large amount of water was 
used and part of the chemicals and their combustion products were thereby spread 
to nearby watercourses. 
Description of the event sequence 
The description is based on the following information sources: (Milj!Zikontoret, 
Storstr!Zims Amt, 1990), (Bostrup, 1989) and private information material received 
from Maribo Seeds. 
At 7.16 pm on Sunday the 22 October 1989, a works manager called the fire 
brigade at a fire which an employee had started deliberately in the NE comer of a 
warehouse (around 1200 m2). After having started the fire, the employee went to 
the manager and told him that a fire had arisen in the warehouse. 
The warehouse was divided into fire sections. The section, in which the fire had 
been started, contained 119 tonnes of seed, 88 tonnes of saw dust, 25 tonnes of 
starch glue, 3.5 tonnes of calcium peroxide and about 6 tonnes of agrochemicals 
(insecticides and fungicides). 
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The fire brigade from RsX}by arrived at the premises at 7.25 pm. A little later the 
fire brigades from Nakskov and Maribo were requested to participate in the fire 
fighting. 
The fire was initially a smouldering fire. Water cooling of walls and entry 
limited the fire to one fire section. At around 9.00 pm the fire was thought to be 
extinguished. Eight firemen, wearing protective clothing and breathing apparatus, 
were therefore sent into the building for damping down operations. However, 
there was a dense smoke in the building, and the fire brigade officer decided to 
withdraw his men as he judged there was a risk of dust explosion. 
A dust explosion occurred - and the fire escalated violently within the fire 
section; it spread rapidly to the nearby stocks of toxic and flammable chemicals. It 
was the brigade officer's opinion that a contributing cause of the fire escalation 
was fire fighting water coming into contact with the calcium peroxide. The fire 
brigade was a priori acquainted with the stored chemicals except the calcium 
peroxide. 
Two firemen, still inside the building when the explosion occurred, were 
hospitalised. 
A police patrol went to Holeby (Holeby is about one kilometre north of Maribo 
Seeds) and there a nuisance of smoke was noted. At 9.42 pm the local radio and 
TV requested the inhabitants in Holeby to remain indoors and keep doors and win-
dows closed. This request was also given via police loudspeaker vehicles. People 
were also warned against a possible pollution of vegetables in the area that had 
been passed by the smoke plume. 
Not until after midnight the fire was under control but the store was burned out 
and the stored material destroyed. About 1500 m3 of water had been used in the 
fire fighting. The fire brigade succeeded in collecting part of the water into a basin 
for washing of beets. 
The day after the fire, biologists from the local environmental authorities dis-
covered dead fish and microorganisms in a nearby stream. The stream flows into a 
channel, which via a pump station leads the water to the Baltic Sea. 
The water flow in the channel was very low. It was therefore decided to build a 
dam a few kilometres downstream of the scene of fire in order to limit the imme-
diate damages; and also to delay the discharge to the Baltic Sea so that the pesti-
cides were decomposed as much as possible before the discharge. 
The extent of the pollution and its reduction with time were monitored by cur-
rently taking water samples from the stream and the polluted soil. Analyses indi-
cated that about 10 kg of pesticides had been washed into the stream. Large 
amounts of seeds and saw dust were also washed into the stream and the resulting 
reduction of the oxygen content was considered a contributory cause of the dam-
age to the stream fauna. After about 5 weeks the fauna began to restore. 
Lessons learnt 
In December 1989 the involved parties and authorities (the fire brigade officer, the 
police, Maribo Seeds, Holeby municipality and the local health authority) held a 
meeting with the aim of deriving lessons learnt. According to a "lessons learnt" 
report, issued by the environmental authorities, the following lessons learnt were 
all agreed upon: 
• The activities of the local environmental authority should be extended to 
include accidental pollution of air, soil and ground water, i.e. the field of 
activity should not only concern watercourses, lakes and coastal waters as it 
was originally planned when the environmental authority was established in 
September 1989. 
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• In the event of an environmental incident as that at Maribo Seeds, a group of 
technicians from involved parties should be established rapidly. The group 
shall ensure that relevant information as fast as possible is accessible to the 
fire brigade officer, the police, the authorities and the public. 
• The contact to the press should be made by as few persons from each part as 
possible; and these persons should be experienced in press contact. Comm-
ent: The police has the duty to inform journalists at a press meeting when a 
comprehensive view of the situation is obtained. General lines for the contact 
to the press is included in the police education. A training module is only 
included in courses for leaders. In connection with the fire at Maribo Seeds, 
many persons - besides the police - spoke to the press and contradictory 
views and incorrect information were given. This resulted in misinformation 
to the public and unnecessary fear. 
• There is a need for rules/regulations for storage of chemicals with respect to 
stock size, location, segregation, fire protection and possibilities for collec-
tion of fire water. Comment: The experiences from the fire in the legal stor-
age of chemicals at Maribo Seeds show that there is a need for more specific 
rules for chemical storages that are not covered by the Seveso Directive and 
the requirements of the fire authorities. 
6.7 Nrestved railway accident 
At 4.50 am on Friday, September 25, 1992, a goods train on its way from R~dby 
to Copenhagen (the DANLINK-route) collided with an empty passenger train 
which was waiting at Nrestved railway station. A tank wagon, containing 67 000 
litres of acrylonitrile turned over and a leakage from a weld seam arose resulting 
in a spillage of approximately 600 litres. The accident occurred because the 
engine driver overlooked a signal and the speed of the train was too high when he 
noticed that the next signal was a stop signal. Although nobody was seriously 
injured or poisoned, the accident revealed several flaws in the preparedness 
against chemical accidents in the transport sector. 
Description of the event sequence 
The description is based on the following information sources: (Jensen, 1992) and 
information material received from DSB (the Danish State Railways) and the 
Emergency Management Agency. 
After the collision had occurred, DSB called the police and the Emergency Ser-
vice in Roskilde from the central signalling post. At 5.00 am the police and ambu-
lance service, Falck, arrived at the accident area. 
The public fire brigade was called by the police at 4.59 am, but the only infor-
mation received was that two trains had collided and that diesel oil was leaking 
from an engine tank. The first tum-out therefore only brought cars with drums and 
equipment for reception of oil (a "reduced" tum-out). 
When the fire brigade officer on duty (the on scene commander) arrived at 5.08 
am he observed that liquid was also flowing from a leakage in the middle of the 
overturned tank wagon. At 5.14 am further fire brigade assistance was requested. 
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To identify the content of the tank wagon the brigade officer mounted the 
wagon so that he could see the up-turned danger sign. After having identified the 
substance acrylonitrile (at around 5.17 am) by means of "Handbook for Emerg-
ency Response Leaders" and "Safety Cards for Road Transport" (CEFIC-cards), 
the police was at 5.20 am informed about name and properties of this substance; 
and the police was also requested to pass this information on to Nrestved county 
hospital. 
After having identified the substance, the brigade officer receives the RID-list 
from DSB (this list includes information on wagons with dangerous goods). 
At 5.30 am Falck informed the hospital that two persons, injured at a train 
accident, were on the way to the hospital. 
The first fire brigade response, initiated at 5.35 am, was to blanket the tank and 
the surrounding ground with a thick layer of foam in order to prevent evaporation 
and ignition of the spilled liquid. Four men, wearing protective clothing and breat-
hing apparatus, then stopped the leakage by means of a wedge of wood and seal-
ing compound. However, due to the location and irregular shape of the untight 
weld seem a complete tightening could not be obtained. 
At 6.02 am the Chemical Emergency Response Service was called. The service 
verified the properties of acrylonitrile. 
At 6.13 am the environmental authorities were called. 
At 6.15 am Falck informed the hospital that the train accident had involved 
spillage of a chemical and that three possibly poisoned persons were on their way 
to the hospital. One of these persons brought the CEFIC-card for acrylonitrile 
which was delivered to the hospital personnel. 
At 6.35 am the civil defence was requested to assist with its environmental pre-
paredness: a team of people, wearing special protective clothing and breathing 
apparatus, sucked spilled liquid into vessels. 
After the situation was considered stable the police established a 100 metres 
safety zone on the advice of the brigade officer. 
At 6.44 am the brigade officer received the wagon information from DSB. 
At 7.00 am the radio informed the public about the accident. 
At 6.50 am (according to the police report) or 7.10 am (according to the hospital 
report) the police informed the hospital about the accident - i.e. around 2 hours 
after it had occurred. After having received this information the hospital called the 
poison information centre at the National University Hospital in Copenhagen and 
was at 8.45 am informed about the antidote to be applied against poisoning from 
cyanide arising from acrylonitrile. 
The hospital then tried to get the antidote from a drug firm in Copenhagen but 
the firm would not deliver the antidote without permission from the National 
Health Board. The hospital got the permission at 10.00 am and the antidote was 
then sent by taxi to the hospital where it was received at 11.45 am - i.e. nearly 7 
hours after the accident occurred. 
During the morning about 30 persons (people from the fire brigade and the civil 
defence) arrived at the hospital and complained about symptoms such as nausea 
and dizziness. Practically all wore contaminated clothing. The hospital has a 
flushing room (decontamination room) but this was not used since nobody had 
informed the hospital about the potential of contamination. The arrived persons 
were therefore just undressed and observed for some time. (Apparently nobody at 
the hospital considered the possibility of contamination after having received - at 
6.15 am- the information that the accident involved a spillage of acrylonitrile and 
the information on its toxic properties). 
In the accident area a safe transfer of the liquid in the tank wagon to pressure 
tanks turned out to be a problem; neither the civil defense nor DSB possessed the 
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necessary containers. After contact to BASF in Denmark, containers and equip-
ment for reloading were ordered in Germany. 
Late in the evening the containers and connecting equipment arrived together 
with specially educated fire fighters from BAYER AG in Brunsbiittel, Germany. 
After a short briefing the reloading was started and it lasted all the night. During 
the reloading and subsequent clearing of the rail track, the safety zone was 
extended to 200 metres and the south-going train traffic was stopped. Since the 
extended safety zone included nearby housing estates, police loudspeaker vehicles 
drove around warning people to remain indoors and keep doors and windows 
closed. This warning was also given by the local radio. 
The further clearing - removal of contaminated soil, pumping of contaminated 
water from a reserve boring for water close to the accident area and cleaning of 
the tank wagon - was rendered to DSB and the environmental authorities. 306 m3 
soil and 606m3 water, contaminated with acrylonitrile, were removed and sent to 
Kommunekemi (plant for destruction of chemical waste). Also 155 m3 oil-con-
taminated ballast and soil were removed. The handling of contaminated ballast 
and soil increased the concentration of acrylonitrile in the air to about 100 ppm. 
Lessons learnt 
The involved fire brigade officer summarizes lessons learned (Jensen, 1992): 
• It is crucial that the alarm message given to the fire brigade is as correct as 
possible. If the goods train contains dangerous substances, this information 
should be given. The existing GTS system with its RID-list should be applied 
in this connection. 
• The Handbook for Emergency Response Leaders is not precise; sludge 
pumps approved for inflammable liquids could not be used as indicated in the 
handbook. 
• The "Emergency Response Manual", issued by the Civil Defence Board, did 
not contain information on acrylonitrile. Comment: If information on a sub-
stance is not given by the manual or by the booklet "Dangerous Substances", 
the fire officer should contact the Chemical Emergency Response Service. 
• Radiocommunication was not established between DSB, the coordinating 
leader and the technical leader. 
• The fire brigade should be acquainted with tank wagon constructions. Con-
necting branches for loading and unloading should be standardized so that 
these components could form parts of the preparedness equipment. 
• It should be possible - from a depot - to procure clean containers for reload-
ing of special substances. Comment: The Emergency Management Agency 
intends to establish a central register containing information about depots 
with clean containers for reloading. 
• Tank wagons with a capacity of 67 000 litres should be considered unaccept-
able. They should be considerably less or be divided into sections. 
• Cleaning of contaminated personnel must be carried out carefully at the 
incident area. 
31 
• The press should be kept away from the incident area. Comment: The police 
has the duty to inform journalists at a press meeting when a comprehensive 
view of the situation is obtained. General lines for the contact to the press is 
included in the police education and a training module is included in courses 
for leaders. 
The Emergency Management Agency, Chemical Laboratory, states the following 
lessons learnt from the acrylonitrile-incident: 
• Early, but distinct briefing of the response teams (fire-fighters, police) about 
chemical and toxicological properties of the chemical in order to prevent 
mistakes or apprehension. 
• Early installation of a wind indicator visible at the site. 
• The effluent from rinsing of protective clothing should be continuously de-
contaminated. 
Some further lessons learnt should be added to the above mentioned: 
• By overturning of a tank wagon containing a dangerous substance, the danger 
signs on the wagon sides cannot be seen from the ground level. An impr-
ovement could be to place danger signs also on the top of the tank, e.g. two 
signs of which at least one is non-inverted when read from the ground level. 
• It is crucial that the brigade officer - as fast as possible - acquires information 
about dangerous goods in wrecked tank wagons. The RID-list with this infor-
mation is kept with the engine driver, but he may be unable to pass it on, or it 
may be impossible for others to get hold of it. Even if the list is procured, it 
could turn out to be difficult to identify a specific wagon if it is wrecked in a 
mess of wagons. Whatever occurs it should therefore be possible to identify 
the tank content by means of the labelling. A dangerous goods list - procured 
from the engine driver or elsewhere - should be considered a back-up source 
of information in relation to the tank labelling. 
• The RID-list should as fast as possible be telefaxcd to the police who has the 
duty to inform the hospital. 
• DSB should work out and maintain a list of dangerous goods transported in 
Denmark so that the Emergency Response Manual as far as possible contains 
cards for all relevant substances. On this basis also the relevant antidotes can 
be identified. Comment: As a post-incident action DSB has worked out such a 
list and it has been sent to hospitals and to the Emergency Management 
Agency. 
• The antidote-preparedness system was insufficient; the antidote against 
acrylonitrile could have been procured from a nearby hospital that had a 
depot of antidotes, but nobody at the Nrestved hospital was aware of its 
existence. Comment: As a post-incident action the Emergency Management 
Agency intends to establish a central register from which doctors can get 
information about existing hospital depots and their contents. 
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7 Selected lessons 
7.1 Dansk Sojakagefabrik 
One set of lessons incorporates the preparedness of the operating crew and proper 
instructions and directives. These lessons are dealt with in Arbejdstilsynet (1981). 
Lessons learnt on emergency management point to two issues: 
• The first lesson confirms the urge to operating plant crews to send timely and 
precise alarm messages. 
• After the fire brigade arrived, the first actions were directed at controlling the 
threat and not at protecting the public by warnings etc. 
The rescue services were not alarmed by the company, but by a bus driver whose 
bus were passing the site. The operators were at the time more occupied with the 
operation troubles than with a developing disaster. 
Viewed as case in disaster control then, the case demonstrates the two aspects in 
controlling threat: the damaging potential of the chemical and the ability to control 
the chemical itself. Studies in the United States (Quarantelli, 1987) showed among 
other things a typical difference between in-transit accidents and in-site accidents. 
In-transit accidents are usually by the first responders seen as transport accidents, 
whereas accidents occurring at a chemical plant are seen as chemical accidents. 
The first actions in site are aimed at controlling the threat, and initial activities in 
in-transit cases are devoted to protecting the public. The decision to switch off 
electricity to the extraction plant was made by the chief fire officer and plant 
representatives in some sort of collaboration, but the fire officer is always for-
mally responsible for emergency decisions. It may not be possible to reconstruct 
the very last moments leading to the explosion, but the case is unique for 
speculations on the collaboration of external fire brigades and plant personnel 
facing dilemmas in disaster control. The case is useful for educating and instruct-
ing fire brigade officers. 
7.2 Mustard gas bombs 
As a category these incident~ are not easy to classify: the meeting of fishing trawls 
with dangerous substances dumped from other ships fifty years ago. These chemi-
cal weapons are still dangerously active and appear sometimes in undamaged 
bombs, sometimes as the spread contents of corroded bombs. 
The emergency operations are difficult, because detection is sometimes late, the 
actual fishermen are inexperienced with the gas, and coming to assistance on open 
sea is both difficult and time consuming. The actual case chosen for this study 
took place close to Swedish territory and directed the focus towards: 
• Late detection of gas spread on cargo, ship and crew. 
33 
• Limited Swedish emergency resources for mustard gas accidents. 
• Difficulties in cleaning operations. 
Experience at this occasion specially called the attention to: 
• Better instruction of fishermen. 
• Better tools for detection of remnants of mustard gas and the cleaning sub-
stance DS 2 during the decontamination work. 
• Better protection of fishermen. 
For economic reasons it is considered impossible to locate, collect and destroy the 
dumped mustard gas bombs and other types of gas bombs in the sea around Den-
mark. But dangerous substances have been - and are still being - dumped in sea 
waters anywhere, and techniques for handling the special threats from these un-
dersea storages have to be developed in any case. The Danish experience from 
fishing mustard gas bombs may serve as one input to improved tools and improved 
emergency management. 
7.3 Nordisk Alkali Biokemi 
The most important lessons learnt from the Nordisk Alkali Biokemi incident 
concern the breathing apparatus and the protective clothing used by the fire brig-
ade: 
• The breathing apparatus could be affected by the released chemicals. Further-
more, inspection of the equipment is only carried out immediately after use. 
Delayed effects from the chemical exposure are therefore not detected 
through periodic inspections. It is eight years ago since the incident occurred 
at NAB, however, the same type of breathing apparatus is still used. 
• There is a need to develop protective clothing which could protect the fire-
men against chemical exposure as well as heat in case of a chemical ware-
house fire. 
7.4 Valdemar Larsen Metal Working 
Two important lessons learnt from the accident at Valdemar Larsen Metal Work-
ing are: 
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• Problems may occur when foreigners are employed, since written instruction 
for normal operations and emergency situations might not be understood. 
• It is an urge to operating crews on duty to send alarm messages. The emer-
gency services were not alarmed by plant personnel, but by a person who 
passed the plant. 
7.5 Matas warehouse fire 
The lessons learnt from the Matas warehouse fire relate particulary to contami-
nated fire fighting water: 
• Disposal of contaminated fire fighting water should be considered in case of 
warehouse fires. 
• More specific rules concerning organization of storages for relatively harm-
less chemicals are needed. 
• The fire brigade should have more information on the substances (such as 
soap, cosmetics, solvents and pesticides) stored in warehouses. 
• Rules for disposal of contaminated fire fighting water are needed. 
7.6 Maribo Seeds company 
The lessons learnt from the fire at Maribo Seeds concern particularly the procure-
ment of information which is relevant for the emergency management, the organ-
ization of storages for chemicals and the disposal of contaminated fire fighting 
water: 
• In the event of a fire in a warehouse containing dangerous chemicals, a group 
of technicians/specialists from involved parties could be needed for procuring 
information relevant to the emergency management. 
• There is a need for rules/regulations for storage of chemicals which in case of 
fire may expose people or environment to risk. 
• Rules are required for disposal of contaminated fire fighting water. 
7.7 Nrestved railway accident 
Several lessons can be learnt from the Nrestved railway accident: 
• In order to insure that the alarm message given to the fire brigade is as cor-
rect as possible, the RID-list should be applied. DSB (Danish State Railway) 
should as fast as possible telefax the list to the police. 
• The danger signs on the sides of a rail tank wagon cannot be seen from the 
ground level if the wagon is turned over. 
• It is important that doctors easily can acquire information on the antidote to 
be applied against a special dangerous substance; and from which hospital 
depot it can be procured. 
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• It is important that the emergency teams easily can acquire information on 
where clean containers for reloading of special substances can be procured. 
• The fire brigade should be acquainted with tank wagon constructions. 
• Cleaning of contaminated personnel must be carried out carefully at the 
incident site. The effluent from rinsing of protective clothing should be con-
tinuously decontaminated. 
8 Conclusions 
After reviewing the Danish emergency organisations and lessons learnt through 
the seven cases, an overview shall be sketched, where issues of general interest 
are pointed out. 
The fire brigades are the emergency forces that have been most exposed in our 
study. They play a central role at most accident sites, where chemicals are 
involved, and they arrive early after alarming. We have noticed important lessons 
concerning these matters: protection means, fire brigade officers' specific plant 
knowledge and their general chemical/physical knowledge. 
Breathing apparatus may develop malfunctioning after being exposed to some 
chemicals. This equipment is checked after use, however, some sort of regular 
testing ought to be added, for both breathing apparatus and chemical protection 
clothing, in order to cover even delayed effects of such exposure. 
During discussions it was revealed, that generally there is a need for developing 
protective clothing, that shields both against heat and chemicals. 
Information needs caused delays or troubles in these cases: 
• Nrestved, identifying the leaking substance, and finding proper handling 
instructions. 
• Maribo Seeds and Matas, identifying the inventory of large stores of chemi-
cals and other substances. 
Large efforts are invested in producing and maintaining the principal information 
sources - cards and handbooks and more modem data banks - but a serious limita-
tion on the use of such means derives from the knowledge and experience with the 
average user. Only rather rough messages can be communicated through passive 
sources to firemen who are not used to that sort of information - this matter was 
discussed further in Rasmussen et al (1987). In the actual cases, the fire brigade 
officers relied much on both plant representatives and advisors like the chemical 
expert on duty in Copenhagen, but it is not always possible to obtain advisory 
support in due time. It must be considered, whether fire brigades in general could 
be better prepared for chemical emergencies in one or both of the following ways: 
• By acquiring more basic knowledge about chemical properties and about the 
behaviour of liquids, vapours and gases etc. 
• By collecting and utilising more specific information on plants, processes and 
storages in their operational area. 
There are short lines to the fire brigades from the local administrations, that regu-
late fire safety, but the actual officer on duty may be called to an industrial acci-
dent site, only knowing how he gets there. The plans show routes and addresses, 
telephone numbers and names, but contain little technical information. 
Experience with transport accidents involving chemicals is scarce: the Nrestved 
case with acrylonitrile is investigated in this study, and some cases with gasoline 
transport and liquified gas on a train were described in an earlier study (Rasmus-
sen et al, 1987). Railway transport of chemicals is an operation, where a very little 
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crew handles vast amounts of chemicals in a rather tight scheme with time 
schedules and other trains, and the train operators can not possibly know much 
about the many chemicals and products on one out of several trains. Therefore the 
train personnel has to treat the cargoes in a very schematic way. 
The impression of hospitals' preparedness for larger accidents is at present, that 
while conventional injuries can be handled even in cases with several injured 
persons, injuries demanding special treatment, decontamination, antidotes and 
perhaps protection of hospital personnel, are still a new challenge to many hospi-
tals. Plans and arrangements for cooperation between hospitals and with rescue 
services and police are rehearsed through more common road accidents, railway 
accidents etc. The seldom and in some respects much more demanding chemical 
accidents and injuries must be trained in exercises. 
The establishment of the newly formed Emergency Management Agency placing 
fire brigades and civil defence forces under one administrative unit is motivated 
by other factors than those found among the lessons learnt in this study. The 
change will ease collaboration between the two branches of the emergency 
organisation and the new organisation may hopefully bear potential for the devel-
opment of high class exercises in all branches of Danish emergency organization. 
Denmark can offer accident experience of a rather special type: the mustard 
bombs caught in fishing trawls in the Baltic Sea. The case included here showed 
few difficulties, but the most prominent message to emergency organizators is 
this: what is going to happen to elderly weapon arsenals like those in the Baltic 
Sea, and how are we going to handle emergencies arising from weapon arsenals 
anywhere in the world? Emergency schemes have to be constructed in connection 
with the planned deconstrution of bombs and chemical weapons, but there must be 
other storages of more or less known sort than those in the Danish subsea regions. 
In none of the seven cases, the public had been informed in advance about the 
specific threats, in fact there are very few places in Denmark, where the public is 
informed about specific risks from industrial plants or railways etc. This situation 
is probably going to change in the coming years. But on several occasions, war-
nings through radio or by police cars with loudspeakers have been given in actual 
emergency situations. The "whens" and "bows" of public warning clearly needs 
some development work, as some emergency managers may hesitate too long in 
front of warning or evacuation decisions, and on the other side some citizens see 
the warning as an invitation, like in the Matas case of this study. From the Missis-
sauga accident in Ontario (Canada) 1979 it has been reported, that responsible 
actors were reluctant about having people evacuated during the night, thereby 
delaying one of the biggest peace time evacuations at accidents with dangerous 
substances. As referred in chapter 5.5 above, the French Lessons Learnt study 
reported positive experience with deciding and conducting a large evacuation in 
Nantes. In Denmark we may have to learn both about warning and evacuation 
schemes from lessons learnt elsewhere, because we are lucky with the chemical 
accidents until now. 
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Appendix 
Completed forms for selected cases 

A.l Dansk sojakagefabrik 
General information 
1.1 Date: 15.07.1980. 
1.2 Time: 0:30a.m. 
1.3 Place: Islands Brygge 34, DK-2300 Copenhagen S. 
1.4 Activity type: Extraction plant for soy beans. The company processed veg-
etable fat from soy beans, whale oil etc. and delivered the products to many dif-
ferent industries, mainly for food production. Among the products were 
hydrogen, used on the plant for fat hardening, and chlorine. 
1.5 Name of company: Dansk Sojakagefabrik (later DS Industries). 
1.6 Topology: The company is situated in the harbour area of Copenhagen with 
easy access to ships and railway. The neighbourhood is a mixture of other 
industries and residential areas, but the latter only occupies approximately one 
quarter of the periphery. 
1.7 Description of buildings: The area of the extraction plant was approximately 
100 meters x 50 meters and was situated with a facade to a public road. This 
road also hold a double railway track. The buildings were typical mid-century 
chemical industry, with most structures made from armed concrete. The roof of 
the extraction building was a light wooden construction covered by eternite. The 
processing equipment for extraction had been installed in 1958 to substitute an 
older plant. 
1.8 Regulations involved: The company was covered by the EEC directive 
82/501/EEC on "Major Industrial Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities". 
1.9 Accident preparedness: None. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: Prior to the accident, no 
general information on the explosion had been sent out to nearby residents. But 
people were well aware of the potentials of a chlorine release from the premises 
of Dansk Sojakagefabrik. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Explosion. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: Hexane, used as a solvent in extraction of soy beans. 
CAS-no. 7782-50-5. Assumed weight 15.000 kg. 
2.3 Other substances at the site: Several substances processed and stored. Hy-
drogen was both produced and used, large amounts of chlorine were stored for 
sale. 
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3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: No influence on the course of the accident. 
3.2 Detection of accident: Gradually increasing amounts of hexane vapours 
caused a kind of "fog" to invade the plant surroundings, detection of the abnor-
mal state occurred when these were an obstacle to traffic in the street outside. 
The fire brigade was alarmed by coincidence shortly after midnight, as the 
alarm centre received a message through the police about airplane fuel on the 
road in front of the site. 
3.3 Description of accident: The accident occurred after a build up of large 
amounts of evaporated hexane due to unstable flows and pressure excursions. A 
large explosion followed, when it was tried to remove ignition sources by dis-
connecting a power supply line. 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: The plant was left before the 
explosion, due to hexane vapours. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: Not reported. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: No. of fire brigade and police personnel 
approximately 20. Ambulance and medical personnel were activated too, corre-
sponding to the number of injured persons. 
4.2 Emergency actions: In collaboration with the plant management, the fire 
brigade officer decided to have the power supply to the plant disconnected. 
After the explosion, resulting fires at the plant had to be extinguished. 
4.3 Equipment used: All fire engines from the Central Fire Station of 
Copenhagen plus two engines from other stations. Eight ambulances called 
immediately after the explosion. 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: Not reported. 
4.5 Medica/treatment of victims: The injured brought to hospitals. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: Not reported. 
4.7 Care for the public: No warnings were given, except to the bus driver who 
was about to drive his bus through the "foggy" area. 
5. Cause of accident 
5.1 Primary cause: The explosion was probably initiated by the attempt to 
disconnect the unloaded one out of three power supply lines to the extraction 
plant. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Several factors leading to the abnormal process state 
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include unstable characteristics of the process flow and inadequate safety in-
structions. A significant part of the emission is ascribed a special component 
serving as a safety valve for overpressure, which could have been activated 
during start up, and left partly open. Contributing factors are unexperienced 
staff and language difficulties. 
6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of person killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 27. 
6.3 Economic losses: The extraction plant was totally destroyed. Insurance pay 
= approx.200 mio DKr. 
6.4 Environmental effects: The explosion caused windows breaking in many 
quarters of Copenhagen, in distances up to 1.5 kilometres. No other significant 
effect to the environment. 
6.5 Map of area affected: None. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: The potential harm was 
considerable, both to humans and to surrounding estates, especially if the chlor-
ine tanks had been damaged by the explosion. 
7. Post incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: The plant has not been reestablished. 
7.2 Recommendations: Several, including improvements of safety interlocks, 
gas detection, fire protection and safety management. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: None. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: The nearby chlorine plant was stopped and 
checked for damages. 
7.6 Information to the public: Not reported. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: Inadequate alarm routine. Dilemma 
when stopping the vapour production may initiate explosion. 
7.8 Authority requirements: 
7.9 Initiated research: None. 
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A.2 Mustard gas bombs 
1. General information 
1.1 Date: 22.03.1984 
2.2 Time: In the afternoon. 
1.3 Place: The Baltic Sea, near Gotland. 
1.4 Activity Type: Trawling. 
1.5 Name of company: Private Faroeish cutter, VA 36 "Heldarstindur". 
1.6 Topology: Not relevant. 
1.7 Description of buildings: The cutter was build as a "floating factory" where 
the fish was cut up and packed into fish boxes. 
1.8 Regulations involved: Act on the Protection of the Marine Environment. Ac-
cording to a government circular, the Navy is responsible for the disablement of 
chemical ammunition that has driven ashore or has been fished up. 
1.9 Accident preparedness: None. According to a national regulation from 
1970, fishing boats, which are using trawl within certain regions of the Baltic 
Sea, shall be provided with first-aid kit for treatment of injuries caused by 
mustard gas. Information on chemical ammunition and warfare agents and pre-
cautions to be taken is given in a Danish handbook for fishermen. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: None. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Release of mustard gas from a bomb which had been caught 
in the trawl. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: Mustard gas, an oily liquid. Deadly vesicant. The 
poisoning symptoms include severe blisters to the skin, injuries to the eyes lead-
ing in some cases to temporary or permanent blindness, and injuries to the lungs 
which may be lethal. 
2.3 Other substances at the site: None. 
3. Accident course 
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3.1 Weather conditions: Not reported. 
3.2 Detection of accident: It was noticed that the quarterdeck was contaminated 
with a greenish liquid, but nobody knew what it was. The liquid was not ident-
ified as being mustard gas until some of the crew members showed intoxication 
symptoms and an object, which had been caught in the trawl, had been ident-
ified as being a mustard gas bomb. An illustration of it was found in the Danish 
handbook for fishermen. An emergency call was then made. 
3.3 Description of accident: A mustard gas bomb was caught in the trawl and 
brought on board. The trawl was emptied and by means of a conveyer belt the 
content was brought below the deck where the crew cut the fish open. The 
bomb was leaky and, in the confined space below the deck, the fish became 
contaminated and the vapour pressure of mustard gas reached a dangerous 
level; after some time all crew members showed severe intoxication symptoms. 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: Not reported. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: Not relevant. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: The Swedish life-saving service, The Danish 
navy, the civil defence, the ambulance service, hospitals in Sweden an Den-
mark. 
4.2 Emergency actions: The seven crew members were picked up by helicopters 
and brought to a hospital in Gotland (Sweden). As the correct treatment could 
not be given at this hospital, they were transferred to a Danish hospital where 
they could be treated. The cutter that was left empty on the sea, was boarded by 
sappers from the Danish navy (the naval district of Bornholm) and then towed 
to the port of R!<}nne where a cordon was threwed round the ship in order to 
establish a safety zone. 
4.3 Equipment used: helicopters, gas-proof chemical protective clothing and 
breathing apparatus (used by the sappers while they were onboard the cutter) 
and a ship for towing. 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: Not relevant. 
4.5 Medical treatment of victims: At the Danish hospital the crew members 
were treated for injuries to the eyes and severe 'burnings' on hands and legs. 
They all recovered after 1 - 2 weeks. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: Not relevant. 
4.7 Care for the public: A cordon was threwed round the ship while it was 
cleaned. 
5. Cause of accident 
5.1 Primary cause: After the termination of the second world war, large 
amounts of chemical ammunition were dumped into the Baltic Sea. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Not known. 
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6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 7 
6.3 Economic losses: Not reported. 
6.4 Environmental effects: None. 
6.5 Map of area affected: Not relevant. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: The amount of released 
mustard gas was large enough to cause the death of all the fishermen if they had 
stayed sufficiently long below the deck. If the fishermen had dumped the 
contaminated fish, the effect on the marine fauna would probably have been 
negligible compared with the effect of mustard gas stemming from leaky bombs 
on the bottom of the sea. 
7. Post-incident actions 
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7.1 Plant modifications: Not relevant. 
7.2 Recommendations: On the background of this accident and others as well, 
the National Agency of Environmental Protection initiated in 1984 an evalu-
ation of the environmental, health and safety aspects of the depositing of chemi-
cal ammunition. As far as the safety of fishermen and other involved persons is 
concerned, the evaluation group concluded that the safety precautions taken by 
the military and civil defence are adequate. To improve the safety of fishermen, 
the following recommendations were made: 
The information material should be improved, particularly with respect to the 
information on symptoms and the precautions to be taken in the event of poi-
soning. 
The first-aid kit should be improved and supplemented with breathing appar-
atus. 
The areas within which there is a risk of catching chemical ammunition should 
be marked on the charts. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: In the port of Rfl)nne the 
ship, trawl and movables were decontaminated by people from the civil defense 
and the military. This work lasted 6 days before the control tracking indicated 
that the ship was clean. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: Yes. Particularly fishermen are exposed 
to a risk from chemical ammunition if they are fishing with trawl within certain 
areas in the Baltic Sea. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: None. 
7.6 Information to the public: Information about the accident was given in 
newspapers. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: The leader of the decontamination 
team stated in the log that the decontamination work was difficult because 
equipment for effective detection of mustard gas and DS 2 were not available. 
(DS 2 is a blend of chemical substances which is used for breaking down the 
gas. Since the DS 2 vapours are toxic and skin contact can cause cauterization, 
protective clothing and breathing apparatus are used). 
7.8 Authority requirements: The national regulation on the contents of first-aid 
kits was revised in 1986. Breathing apparatus is now included in each kit. 
7.91nitiated research: None. 
A.3 Nordisk Alkali Biokemi 
1. General information 
1.1 Date: 14.04.1985. 
1.2 Time: 7.30 pm. 
1.3 Place: Islands Brygge 91-93, Copenhagen. 
1.4 Activity type: Chemical warehouse. 
1.5 Name of company: Nordisk Alkali Biokemi NS. 
1.6 Topology: Industrial area and residences. 
1.7 Description of buildings: Most buildings were made of concrete or bricks. 
1.8 Regulations involved: The company was covered by the EEC directive 
82/501/EEC on "Major Industrial Hazards of Certain Industrial Activities". 
1.9 Accident preparedness: No emergency response plans were worked out. No 
safety analysis was carried out. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: No information had been 
given to the public. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Chemical decomposition. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: Orthocide 83 (83% captan- N-trichloromethyl-thio-
tetrahydrophthalimide), CAS-no. 133-06-2. 200 kg. 
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2.3 Other substances at the site: A large number of different pesticides and 
organic solvents. 
3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: Not important. 
3.2 Detection of accident: An employee observed a white chemical cloud from 
one of the buildings at 7.30 pm on Sunday 14.04.1985. 
3.3 Description of accident: Toxic gases were released from a silo containing 
about 200 kg of the fungicide Orthocide 83. It was observed that the stirrer in 
the silo was running. It was probable that the stirrer had done that since the 
night before and that heat evolved from friction had initiated a decomposition of 
the chemical compound. The thermal decomposition of captan is an exothermal 
process, i.e. heat is produced. 
3.4 Belulviour of plant staff and management: The management decided that 
cleaning of the equipment with large amounts of water should be carried out in 
order to avoid corrosion. 
3.5 Belulviour of the public: The neighbours were not aware that the accident 
had occurred. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: Fire brigade, (environmental authorities to 
give advise on discharge of contaminated water). 
4.2 Emergency actions: Cooling water to stop the decomposition. 
4.3 Equipment used: Fire hoses, breathing apparatus and protective clothing. 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: Cleaning of the equipment with large 
amounts of water was carried out in order to avoid corrosion. 
4.5 Medical treatment of victims: No victims. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: No information available. 
4.7 Care for the public: No actions were necessary. 
5. Cause of accident 
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5.1 Primary cause: Stirrer in the silo with the substance was erroneously run-
ning. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Managerial omissions. 
6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 0. 
6.3 Economic losses: At least DKR 80.000. 
6.4 Environmental effects: None. 
6.5 Map of area affected: No area affected. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: If larger amounts of chemi-
cals and/or other pesticides stored at the plant had been involved, persons in the 
neighbourhood could have been killed or injured. 
7. Post-incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: None. 
7.2 Recommendations: None. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: Due to corrosion of 
machinery at the plant caused by the released acid cleaning with large amounts 
of water was carried out in order to limit the economical losses. The water 
contaminated with acid was discharged to the sewer system. This action was 
carried out in agreement with the environmental authorities. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No. Furthermore, the plant has recently 
been closed for other reasons. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: Chemical analyses of the samples from the silo 
were carried out. It was confirmed that a polymerization had occurred and that 
the gases released were mainly hydrogen chloride and sulphur dioxide. The 
incident was probably a decomposition combined with a smouldering fire. The 
maximum possible amounts of released gases were 70 kg HCl and 20 kg S02• 
Even if these amounts of gases were released in a relatively short period (e.g. 60 
min.) no acute health effects to people in the neighbourhood would occur. 
7.6/nformation to the public: No information was given. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: The breathing apparatus used by 
the fire brigade could be affected by the released chemicals. 
7.8 Authority requirements: A safety analysis should be carried out. 
7.9 Initiated research: None. 
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A.4 Valdemar Larsen Metal Working 
1. General information 
1.1 Date: 25.04.1985. 
1.2 Time: 5.43 pm. 
1.3 Place: Carl Jacobsensvej 19, Valby, Copenhagen. 
1.4 Activity type: Metal and casting factory. 
1.5 Name of company: Valdemar Larsen Metal Working. 
1.6 Topology: Industrial area and residences. 
1.7 Description of buildings: Traditional industrial style. 
1.8 Regulations involved: Environmental Protection Act. 
1.9 Accident preparedness: A two page emergency plan for the chlorination 
facility was worked out. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: No information had been 
given to the public. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Toxic gas release. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: Chlorine. CAS-no. 7782-50-5. 160 kg. 
2.3 Other substances at the site: No information available. 
3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: wind from the west. Wind speed 5-11 rn/s. Humidity 50%. 
3.2 Detection of accident: A person who passed the plant smelled chlorine and 
alarmed the police at 5.43 pm. When the police arrived the fire brigade was 
immediately alarmed. 
3.3 Description of accident: The chlorine was leaking from a 500 kg drum. The 
leaking drum was connected to the chlorinating facility. A hot water spray was 
in operation in order to facilitate the evaporation of the chlorine (the liquid 
chlorine is evaporting when released from the drum. Evaporation of chlorine 
requires large amounts of heat and the temperature of the liquid chlorine will 
rapidly decrease and the evaporation rate will therefore also decrease). The 
accidental release took place via the valve at the drum. The bushing was loose 
and the stem had thereby been ejected causing a rapid relase to the surround-
ings. 
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3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: The management came to the site 
when they learnt that an accident had occurred. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: No information available. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: Fire brigade, police. 
4.2 Emergency actions: The fire brigade located the point of release, stopped 
the hot water spray system and found and refitted the bushing and valve stem 
thus stopping the release of chorine. 
4.3 Equipment used: Breathing apparatus. 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: None. 
4.5 Medical treatment of victims: Four staff members, three police men and a 
fire man were hospitalized for 24 hours. No permanent injuries were however 
observed. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: No information available. 
4.7 Care for the public: The police sealed off the area and initiated a warning of 
the population via the radio. The population was instructed to remain indoor and 
close doors and windows. The bus routes were also changed. 
5. Cause of accident 
5.1 Primary cause: The cause of the accident apparently was incorrect handling 
of the chlorine drum by one of the staff members working in the chlorine room. 
The valve stem and the bushing had been unscrewed by force overriding the 
locking provided by a screw. After unscrewing the bushing and valve stem were 
ejected and the chlorine was released. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Education of the staff might not have been sufficient. 
Language problems might also have had relation to the cause of accident. 
6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 0. 
6.3 Economic losses: No information available, but the losses were probably not 
significant. 
6.4 Environmental effects: None. 
6.5 Map of area affected: No area affected. 
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6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: The potential consequences 
would not have been substantially higher even if the total amount of chlorine 
(i.e. 1000 kg) had been released. A release of 1000 kg chlorine is assessed not 
to have a potential to cause toxic effects to people in the neighbourhood. 
7. Post-incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: None. 
7.2 Recommendations: It has been recommended to provide the extension rod 
with a one way retcket key assuring that operation from the outside can only 
result in valve closing. However, such an installation would not have had any 
influence on the actual accident. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: None. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No. The plant is now closed. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: None. 
7.6/nformation to the public: No information was given. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: When plant staff comprises 
persons from other countries language problems might occur. 
7.8 Authority requirements: None. 
7.9/nitiated research: None. 
A.S Matas warehouse fire 
1. General information 
1.1 Date: 05.06.1988. 
1.2 Time: 5.49 pm. 
1.3 Place: Brabrand, Arhus. 
1 .4 Activity type: Warehouse. 
1.5 Name of company: Matas. 
1.6 Topology: Industrial area and residences. 
1.7 Description of buildings: 3000 m2 concrete building. 
1.8 Regulations involved: Environmental Protection Act. 
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1.9 Accident preparedness: No emergency response plans were made. No safety 
analysis was carried out. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: No information had been 
given to the public. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Fire. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: Soap, cosmetics, pesticides, solvents. 
2.3 Other substances at the site: All substances present were involved. 
3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: Not specified. 
3.2 Detection of accident: Not specified. 
3.3 Description of accident: The fire itself could be described as a rather tradi-
tional warehouse fire. In the warehouse various products were stored, e.g. soap, 
cosmetics, pesticides, solvents and different packaging materials. The fire brig-
ade did not have any detailed knowledge on the type and amount of products. 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: Not specified. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: Even though the people in the area was told to stay 
indoor a large number of persons came to the fire site in order to watch what 
was going on. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: Fire brigade, (environmental authorities to 
give advise on discharge of contaminated fire fighting water). 
4.2 Emergency actions: Fire fighting. 
4.3 Equipment used: Usual fire fighting equipment. 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: The main problem was the large amount 
of fire fighting water contaminated with chemicals and soap. No spill basins to 
collect the fire fighting water were available. The total amount of water released 
was approximately 1000 m3• Due to the large amount of soap in the water the 
pH value was quite high. If nothing had been done the contaminated water 
would have been discharged to a stream and via a pond and a lake to a small 
river. The lake and the small river had a high ecological classification. 
Additional water was therefore led to local stream in order to dilute the con-
taminated fire fighting water and protect the ecosystem. Furthermore, parts of 
the contaminated fire fighting water was transferred via the sewer system to the 
biological waste water treatment plant. 
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4.5 Medical treatment of victims: No victims. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: No specific actions. 
4.7 Care for the public: The population was informed through radio and televi-
sion to stay indoor and keep doors and windows closed until the next morning. 
5. Cause of accident: 
5.1 Primary cause: Failure of loading station for electrical trucks. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Unknown. 
6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 0. 
6.3 Economic losses: Unknown. 
6.4 Environmental effects: Death fish in the local ecosystem. Effects at the 
biological waste water treatment plant. 
6.5 Map of area affected: No area affected. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: Effects to the local ecosys-
tems. It is uncertain if the fire plume had the potential to cause toxic effects to 
people. 
7. Post-incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: None. 
7.2 Recommendations: None. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: Additional water was 
led to the local stream in order to dilute the contaminated fire fighting water and 
protect the ecosystem. Furthermore, parts of the contaminated fire fighting 
water was transferred via the sewer system to the biological waste water treat-
ment plant. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: None. 
7.6/nformation to the public: No specific information was given to the public. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: In case of warehouse fires it should 
carefully be considered how the contaminated fire fighting water should be 
handled. 
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7.8 Authority requirements: None. 
7.9/nitiated research: None. 
A.6 Maribo Seeds Company 
1. General information 
1.1 Date: 22.10.1989. 
1.2 Time: Around 7.00 pm. 
1.3 Place: H!l!jbygftrdvej 14, DK 4960 Holeby. 
1.4 Activity type: Seed production and treatment. 
1.5 Name of company: Maribo Seeds Company. 
1.6 Topology: Flat and sparse populated agricultural area. The nearest town, 
Holeby, is about one kilometre north of Maribo Seeds Company. 
1.7 Description of buildings: The building hit by fire was a 1200 m2 storage 
building with a flat roof. The building was divided into fire cells/sections. The 
fire was limited to one of the sections. 
1.8 Regulations involved: Environmental Protection Act. 
1.9 Accident preparedness: No emergency response plans were made. A safety 
analysis, carried out in January 1989 by a consultancy firm, included recom-
mendations as to preventing fire spreading and toxic substances in being dis-
charged to the environment via the fire water. When the fire brigade officer 
arrived at the fire scene, representatives from the firm informed about which 
chemicals were stored. However, a stock of calcium peroxide was not men-
tioned. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: None. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Fire and dust explosion. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: 88000 kg of saw dust, 25000 kg of starch glue, 
119000 kg of seed, 2600 kg of Merusol (trade name) containing 50% methioca-
rb, CAS-no 2032-65-7, 200 kg of thiram, CAS-no 137-26-8, 325 kg of hymex-
azol, CAS-no 10004-44-1, 200 kg of iprodione, CAS-no 36734-19-7, 30 kg of 
carbofuran, CAS-no 1563-66-2, 7600 kg of calcium peroxide. 
2.3 Other substances at the site: Seed and packing materials and were stored in 
the other fire sections of the building. 
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3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: Wind from south. 
3.2 Detection of accident: An employee started the fire deliberately at around 
6.00 pm. Shortly after at 7.00 pm he alarmed a works manager who ascertained 
the fire and called the fire brigade at 7.16 pm. 
3.3 Description of accident: The fire had been started in a comer of a fire sec-
tion and involved in the beginning saw dust, starch glue and seed. After a dust 
explosion the fire spread rapidly to the nearby storage of pesticides and fungi-
cides. A contributing cause of the fire escalation might be that fire water had 
come into contact with the stock of calcium peroxide. In fighting the fire a large 
amount of fire water was used - about 1500 m3• Only part of the fire water could 
be collected. The finding of dead fish and microorganisms in a nearby stream 
indicated that pesticides and decomposition products had been discharged to the 
environment. It is estimated that about 10 kg of toxic substances had been 
released via the fire water. 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: Not specified. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: Not specified. 
4. Emergency measures 
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4.1 Emergency services involved: The public fire brigade, the ambulance ser-
vice (Falck), the police, the civil defence, biologists from the local environ-
mental authority and the local health authority (medical officer of health). 
4.2 Emergency actions: The fire fighting involved water cooling of wall and 
entry so that the fire was limited to one fire section. 
4.3 Equipment used: Usual fire fighting equipment. The fire fighters wore brea-
thing apparatus when they were inside the building (special protective clothing 
was not used). 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: A main problem was the large amount 
of contaminated fire water. Part of the fire water was collected into a basin for 
washing of beets. 
4.5 Medical treatment of victims: Two firemen were hospitalised. They were 
inside the building when the dust explosion occurred and they caught a shock. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: No specific actions/requirements. 10- 12 employees 
participated in the clearing work without use of breathing apparatus - and they 
worked together with ambulance people who all wore breathing apparatus. 
4.7 Care for the public: The public was informed on radio and TV to stay 
indoors and keep doors and windows closed. People were also warned against a 
possible pollution of vegetables in the area that had been passed by the smoke 
plume. 
5. Cause of accident 
5.1 Primary cause: A pyromaniac set on fire in some papers and packing 
material. 
5.2 Underlying causes: Not known. 
6. Consequences of accident 
6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: Two firemen were hospitalised. 
6.3 Economic losses: Not reported. The fire section and its content of products 
were destroyed. 
6.4 Environmental effects: Dead fish and microorganisms in a nearby stream. 
6.5 Map of area affected: None. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: In addition to damage to the 
fauna from contaminated fire water, toxic combustion products in the plume of 
smoke might influence the health of people hit by the plume. 
7. Post-incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: 1) The storage building has been rebuild with a separ-
ate storage for chemicals consisting of four fire cells with concrete walls and 
roofs. The products stored in the cells are liquid chemicals, powdered chemi-
cals, oxidizing chemicals and empty packing. The products in a cell can, if 
necessary, be removed via a door leading to the open. 2) Installation of a fire 
alarm system with direct alarm to the fire brigade. 3) Fire water in the cells can 
now be collected in a well from which it can be pumped into tank trucks. 
7.2 Recommendations: None. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: After having found 
dead fish and microorganisms in the nearby stream, which flows into a channel 
leading water to the Baltic Sea, a dam was build a few kilometres downstream 
of the fire scene in order to limit the immediate damages; and also to delay the 
discharge to the Baltic Sea so that the toxic substances were decomposed as 
much as possible before the discharge. Contaminated soil was filled into drums 
which were sent to Kommunekemi (plant for destruction of chemical waste). 
During this work breathing apparatus was used. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No. 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: The extent of the water stream pollution and its 
reduction with time were currently monitored by taking samples. Also the col-
lected fire water was currently monitored. 
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7.6Information to the public: Some newspapers gave incorrect information and 
overdramatized the incident. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: In the event of fire in a warehouse 
containing dangerous chemicals, a working group consisting of technicians 
from involved parties should be established rapidly after the incident. The group 
shall ensure that relevant information as fast as possible is accessible to the fire 
brigade, the police, the authorities and the public. 
The contact to the press should be made by as few people as possible; and these 
persons should be experienced in press contact. At the fire at Maribo Seeds 
many people - besides the police - spoke to the press and contradictory views 
and incorrect information were given. This resulted in misinformation to the 
public and unnecessary fear. 
The fire revealed a need for rules/regulations for chemical storages which are 
not covered by the Seveso Directive and the requirements of the fire authorities. 
Comment: According to the Danish Preparedness Act (1993), the Minister of 
the Interior shall lay down rules for storage of "substances which as a con-
sequence of fire or other damage may expose people, property or environment 
to a risk". 
7.8 Authority requirements: None. 
7.9Initiated research: None. 
A. 7 Nrestved railway accident 
1. General information 
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1.1 Date: 25.09.1992. 
1.2 Time: 4.50 a.m. 
1.3 Place: Nrestved railway station. 
1.4 Activity type: Goods train transport. 
1.5 Name of company: DSB (the Danish State Railways). 
1.6 Topology: The railway station is on all sides adjacent to private houses and a 
bus station. 
1.7 Description of buildings: Not relevant. 
1.8 Regulations involved: RID, RID A (contains national regulations in addition 
to the international rules in RID) and DSB's own security regulations. 
1.9 Accident preparedness: Preparedness for alarm calling and clearing oper-
ations. 
1.10 Information to the public prior to the accident: None. 
2. The accident 
2.1 Accident type: Spill of dangerous substance when a goods train crashed into 
a passenger train waiting at the railway station. 
2.2 Substance(s) involved: 600 litres of acrylonitrile (UN no. 336-1093, CAS-
no. 107-13-1, a flammable, toxic liquid with vapours heavier than air). 
2.3 Other substances at the site: Diesel oil (diesel oil from the engines was 
spilled but not ignited). 
3. Accident course 
3.1 Weather conditions: Light breeze from South East. 
3.2 Detection of accident: A railwayman on the platform gave the alarm, em-
phasizing the presence of two injured and a spill of diesel oil from the engines. 
After arrival, the fire brigade officer in duty discovered a leaking tank wagon. 
3.3 Description of accident: A goods train on its way from R!Mby to 
Copenhagen (the DANLINK-route, a transport route for goods between the 
continent and Sweden, Norway and Finland) collided with an empty passenger 
train waiting for passengers at the railway station. The engines of the two trains 
clashed, and goods wagons were scattered all over the rails. A tank wagon, 
containing 67000 litres of acrylonitrile, turned over and a leakage from a weld 
seem arose resulting in a spillage of approximately 600 litres. 
3.4 Behaviour of plant staff and management: The collaboration between the 
response teams and the staff of DSB was satisfactory. 
3.5 Behaviour of the public: No remarks. 
4. Emergency measures 
4.1 Emergency services involved: The public fire brigade, the police, the civil 
defence, the ambulance service (Falck), Nrestved hospital, the Chemical Emerg-
ency Response Service. 
4.2 Emergency actions: After the fire brigade officer had identified that the 
leaking substance was acrylonitrile and had got the information on its chemical 
and toxicological properties, the first brigade response was to blanket the tank 
and spill with foam. The hole was then proofed and the remaining dripping 
catched. 
A civil defence group, wearing special protective clothing and breathing appar-
atus, sucked spilled liquid into vessels. 
After the situation was considered stable, the police established on the advice of 
the fire brigade officer a 100 metres safety zone and informed the hospital about 
the accident. 
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The following night the load of 67000 I acrylonitrile was pumped into special 
tank containers that were procured from Germany. The tank wagon was lifted 
and removed. During that session the safety zone was expanded to 200 m due to 
the flammability of the product. 
4.3 Equipment used: Vehicles with water tanks and foam equipment, gas-proof 
chemical clothing, breathing apparatus, wedges of wood and sealing compound, 
gas detectors, containers and equipment for reloading (pumps and connecting 
equipment). 
4.4 Prevention of consecutive damage: None. 
4.5 Medical treatment of victims: The hospital actions included treatment of 
injured railwaymen, and observation of 24 responders and policemen for intoxi-
cation. An antidote against acrylonitrile was procured. 
4.6 Care for the plant staff: DSB-people were not involved in emergency 
actions. 
4.7 Care for the public: Since the extended safety zone of 200 metres included 
nearby housing estates, police loudspeaker vehicles drove around warning 
people to remain indoors and keep doors and windows closed. 
5. Cause of accident 
5.1 Primary cause: The engine driver overlooked a signal and the speed of the 
train was too high when he noticed that the next signal was a stop signal. 
5.2 Underlying causes: The signal system (the I- and SI-signal system) has a 
low tolerance to simple human errors. 
6. Consequences of accident 
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6.1 Actual number of persons killed: 0. 
6.2 Actual number of persons injured: 2. 
6.3 Economic losses: Not available. 
6.4 Environmental effects: The degassing of acrylonitrile persisted down to the 
appearance of the ground water. A sample drilling near the incident area con-
firmed the presence of acrylonitrile in the first level of ground water. 
6.5 Map of area affected: Not available. 
6.6 Potential harm to humans and the environment: If 67000 litres of 
acrylonitrile had been released rapidly, then the situation had been very serious. 
The number of intoxicated people in the vicinity might have been several hun-
dreds and the ground water would have been seriously polluted. In the event of 
fire, the smoke plume would have contained very toxic components such as 
HCN. 
7. Post-incident actions 
7.1 Plant modifications: Not relevant. 
7.2 Recommendations: No recommendations from authorities. DSB is respon-
sible for the security. 
7.3 Precautions taken to prevent or limit consequences: Acrylonitrile-contami-
nated soil was removed and sent to Kommunekemi (plant for destruction of 
chemical waste). The percolate from sample drillings was pumped up to prevent 
dispersion. The content of acrylonitrile in the percolate was stripped off in a 
charcoal filter before disposal in the sewerage. Also oil contaminated ballast 
and soil were removed. 
7.4 Does dangerous situation still exist: No 
7.5 Post-incident investigations: DSB has carried out a comprehensive post-
incident investigation. 
7.6 Information to the public: None, except the incident information received 
via radio and newspapers. 
7.7 Emergency management, lessons learnt: In order to ensure that the alarm 
message given to the fire brigade is as correct as possible, the GTS system with 
its RID-list should be applied. DSB should as fast as possible telefax the RID-
list to the police. 
The fire brigade should be acquainted with tank wagon constructions. 
Connecting branches for unloading should be standardized so that these compo-
nents form parts of the preparedness system. 
The Emergency Management Agency intends to establish a central register con-
taining information on depots from which clean containers for reloading of 
special substances can be procured. 
Cleaning of contaminated personnel must be carried out carefully at the incident 
area. The effluent from rinsing of protective clothing should be continuously 
decontaminated. 
The danger signs on the sides of a rail tank wagon cannot be seen from the 
ground level if the wagon is turned over. 
In order to ensure that the information system on dangerous substances include 
those transported by rail, DSB has worked out a list of the transported danger-
ous goods. The list, that will be maintained, has been sent to the Emergency 
Management Agency and to hospitals. 
To improve the antidote-preparedness system, the Emergency Management 
Agency intends to establish a central register from which doctors can get infor-
mation about existing hospital depots and their contents. 
7.8 Authority requirements: None. 
7.9 Initiated research: None. 
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Danish accidents involving dangerous substances have been reviewed in order to 
analyze experience with mitigation and emergency organization. Seven cases from the 
period 1980-1992 were selected for investigation. 
The central events were: hexane explosion, mustard gas bombs in fishing trawl, de-
composing pesticide, chlorine release, two warehouse fires and acrolynitrile release 
from a railway tank wagon. The lessons learnt concern: a need for proper and timely 
alarm from plant crew to fire brigade, difficulties with identification and provision of anti-
dote, exposure of breathing apparatus to aggressive chemicals, inadequate or missing 
knowledge with fire brigade on the inventory of ware-houses, and finally disposal of fire 
fighting water. The study points out, that the technical knowledge of the average fire 
brigade might be improved in areas like basic chemistry and physics and in knowing 
the construction of ordinary railway tank wagons. 
Data sheets for the investigated cases are brought in appendix. 
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